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Regulatory commentators have identified the need for more responsive regulation to 
allow enforcement agencies to respond to different types and degrees of non-
compliance. One tool considered to support responsive enforcement is the Enforceable 
Undertaking (EU). EUs are used extensively by Australian regulators in decisions that 
forego litigation in exchange for offenders promising to (amongst other things) correct 
behaviour and comply in the future. This arguably allows regulatory agencies greater 
flexibility in how they obtain compliance with regulations. EUs became an additional 
enforcement tool for the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) under the Fair Work Act 2009. 
This paper is a preliminary exploration of the comparative use of EUs by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission and the FWO to assess their effectiveness for 
the minimum labour standards' environment. 
Introduction 
Regulatory enforcement agencies, such as the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), have an ultimate 
goal of inducing compliance with the regulations for which they are responsible. The strategies by 
which such compliance is achieved may vary dramatically between agencies, this variation being 
the result of multiple factors related to the activity or industry being regulated, the agency's 
legislative mandate, and the resources available. The regulatory literature initially identified dual 
approaches to enforcement which were diametrically opposed: conciliatory or accommodative 
approaches (using education, advice and persuasion tactics) versus sanction-oriented, legalistic 
approaches (using punishment-based techniques such as fines and prosecutions). These have been 
termed the compliance and deterrence models respectively (Braithwaite, Walker and Grabosky 
1987). Subsequent research identified variations in practice at the compliance model end of the 
enforcement spectrum, termed persuasive compliance and insistent compliance, allowing distinctive 
sub-sets to be analysed (Hutter 1989:156).  
Reliance by enforcement agencies solely on either accommodative measures or penal sanctions has 
been identified as problematic, with the former resulting in a failure to deter and the latter 
potentially resulting in resistance from regulatees (Gunningham and Johnstone 1999). The solution 
is seen to be in achieving a ‘judicious mix of deterrence and persuasive approaches’ (Bluff and 
Johnstone 2003:338), and this is argued to occur through ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayers and 
Braithwaite 1992). Responsive regulation focuses on agencies providing actions/responses tailored 
to specific circumstances, rather than a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Underpinning this responsive 
approach is a range of enforcement tools allowing the regulator to use less interventionist tools to 
help business comply voluntarily, but, if this does not occur, the severity of the mechanism used can 
be progressively increased to force compliance.  
Rather than being viewed as a linear continuum, responsive regulation is typically illustrated within 
a pyramidal framework, with the peak housing the most severe sanctions and the base the least 
interventionist practices (Hardy and Howe 2009). A similar hierarchical structure for penalties 
(from most severe to least interventionist) has been outlined by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) (2002:chapter 3) as consisting of: criminal penalties (imprisonment and 
fines); civil penalties (pecuniary penalties, monetary penalties, injunctions, compensation to third 
parties, and community service orders); administrative penalties (monetary penalties and charges, 
infringement notices, negotiated penalties, publicity) and quasi-penalties (restricting rights and 
banning orders, withholding licences, withholding financial benefits and enforceable undertakings).  
An Enforceable Undertaking (EU) has been defined simply as ‘a promise enforceable in court’ 
(ALRC 2002:100-101). EUs are viewed as providing both a hierarchical element within the 
enforcement pyramid, and a way of allowing regulators to tailor sanctions to the individual 
organisation (Johnstone & King 2008). Parker (2004: 212) suggests EUs are ‘valuable because they 
are an alternative to traditional coercive, regulatory enforcement action,’ while Johnstone & Parker 
2010:5) emphasise their ability to ‘secure quick and effective remedies...[and]...potential to provide 
non-adversarial and constructive solutions to regulatory compliance issues.’  
EUs have been considered by many (for example Hardy and Howe 2009; Ayers and Braithwaite 
1992) to align with notions of responsive regulation and restorative justice. Restorative justice is 
defined as ‘a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to 
resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future’ 
(Braithwaite cited in Parker 2004:14). Parker (2004:14-20) suggests that both the process and 
content of EUs can be restorative. Hence EUs provide regulators with additional flexibility when 
determining the most appropriate regulatory response to a particular breach (responsive regulation), 
and provide a formal mechanism to ensure restitution for victims of that breach (restorative justice).  
Our interest is in the use of EUs for non-compliance with minimum labour standards. EUs were 
introduced under section 715 of the Fair Work Act 2009. Our objective is to better understand the 
processes by which an agency determines whether an EU is an appropriate enforcement decision, 
what types of conditions are enforced, and the benefits of EUs for the affected parties and the 
broader community. In making EUs regulators must balance the tensions raised between behaving 
in a consistent, predictable, transparent manner and the ability to use a flexible tool to ‘negotiate 
tailored, individual, forward-looking solutions to idiosyncratic problems’ (Johnstone and Parker 
2010:19). Thus both the agency’s internal policies and processes and the individual negotiation with 
the alleged offender over the EU are important. 
As many agencies use EUs, our comparison is limited to two agencies: the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the FWO. The ACCC has considerable experience with 
these enforcement tools within an enforcement environment that primarily focuses on organisations 
as both the offender and the ‘victim.’ In contrast, the FWO has more limited experience, and the 
enforcement environment typically involves organisational offences against individuals (as 
workers). By comparing the usage of EUs by the two agencies we hope to provide a preliminary 
consideration of the utility of EUs within the minimum labour standards' (MLS) enforcement 
environment.  In doing so, the paper considers EU's history and difference to other enforcement 
tools before outlining the context and content of EUs negotiated by the ACCC and FWO. The 
primary difference of EUs as an enforcement tool, their ability to enforce additional obligations, is 
explored to highlight the differences ACCC and FWO usage, before a discussion EU's utility for 
MLS enforcement is undertaken.  
Enforceable undertakings and the regulators 
EUs are an Australian initiative. Introduced into the federal Trade Practices Act 1974 (section 87B) 
in 1993, they legislatively recognised an informal practice used by the ACCC since the late 1980s 
(Parker 2004:7). The ACCC, an independent regulatory agency focused on improving ‘competition 
and efficiency in markets’ (Nehme 2009:202), was the first regulator empowered to accept EUs in 
relation to matters for which it has a power or function (Nehme 2009:197). The EUs ‘avoided 
considerable costs to both the Commission and the businesses concerned’ and reinforced actions 
that had been ‘demonstrably advantageous to affected third parties and to consumers generally’ 
(Attorney-General cited in Nehme 2009:200). The ACCC undertakings register shows that the 
regulator entered into approximately 1156 EUs between 1993 and August 2011.1 
EUs quickly became popular with both regulators and the regulated community (ALRC 2002:254-
255) both in Australia and overseas. At the Australian state level EUs are principally used in the 
areas of occupational health and safety, environmental protection and consumer protection while at 
federal level they are used by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Therapeutic Goods 
Administration, Private Health Insurance Administration Council, Comcare and ASIC among 
others (Johnstone & Parker 2010).  
EUs have also been available for addressing non-compliance with minimum labour standards since 
1 July 2009. The FWO accepts EUs as a mechanism for formalising voluntary rectification of 
breaches following an investigation, and the FWO website identifies 15 EUs entered into between 1 
July 2009 and 30 June 2011 (FWO EU Register). The majority of these involved monetary 
restitution to employees. 
Context and content of EUs in ACCC and FWO 
The EU policies or guidelines of the FWO (2009) and ACCC (2009) highlight many commonalities 
outlined in Table 1 below. Both regulatory bodies view EUs as an important mechanism within 
their array of enforcement remedies, allowing for efficient and innovative outcomes that promote a 
compliance culture whilst providing timely restitution for victims. EUs can only be used where the 
regulator reasonably believes that a person has contravened a civil remedy or administrative action 
provision (not criminal breaches) and are an alternative to commencing litigation2 or using another 
enforcement remedy (e.g. issuing a Compliance Notice). Once an EU has been accepted it can only 
be withdrawn or varied with written consent from the regulatory body concerned, and on limited 
grounds. The FWO's (2009:5) policy specifically states that acceptance of an EU does not create a 
binding precedent on the regulators in relation to future EUs from the same person or in relation to a 
similar breach by another person. The ACCC guidelines (2009:5) imply a similar approach to 
proposed EUs. 
Neither regulator considers EUs to be a ‘soft option’, and set demanding preconditions for 
consideration of a proposed EU. These include that the alleged wrongdoer admits to the 
contravention, is willing to cooperate with the regulator, and it is in the public interest to resolve the 
matter using an EU. Entering into an EU is voluntary and the process requires the offending person 
or organisation to take the initiative by ‘offering’ an EU to the regulator for consideration. The 
process begins with the alleged wrongdoer discussing the possibility with the relevant staff member 
(i.e. the case officer or inspector in charge of the investigation). The FWO guidelines (2009:4-5) 
suggest that the initiative is solely at the discretion of the alleged wrongdoer, whilst the ACCC 
guidelines (2009:5) state that ACCC staff may canvas the option of entering into an EU once an 
investigation is at an advanced stage.  
If the person decides to proceed, an initial offer is made to the regulator and the terms and 
conditions of the proposed EU are then negotiated. However, none of the guidelines clearly outline 
the actual process of these negotiations nor the actors involved. Both guidelines make it clear that 
the acceptance or rejection of an EU offer is a formal decision made only by authorised senior 
personnel3 but it remains unclear as to whether these senior figures are involved in the negotiation 
process or simply accept or reject the proposed EU in the form it is presented. 
In summary, the main characteristics of these EUs are: an admission of the contravention in 
question; a description of that contravention; details on how the contravention will be remedied; a 
reporting mechanism through which the remedial action can be monitored; actions to promote 
future compliance; and an acknowledgement that the regulator will publicise these details. While 
the FWO always requires the wrong-doer to publicise the contravention(s) and the remedial action 
to be undertaken, the ACCC may also require offending organisations to make the details available, 
especially if the issue relates to dangerous products or misleading conduct. 
Table 1: Content of Enforceable Undertakings 
FWO ACCC 
An EU must contain: 
 an admission of the contravention 
 a detailed description of the contravention 
 an agreement to remedy the contravention in a 
specified manner (rectification of 
underpayments) and the timeframe within 
which the contravention will be remedied 
 any other specific actions the wrongdoer 
agrees to undertake and the relevant 
timeframe within which these actions will 
occur 
 an acknowledgement that the FWO may make 
an application to the court for orders against 
the wrongdoer if that person fails to comply 
with the EU 
 
An EU usually contains the following elements: 
 an acknowledgment or admission that the conduct 
of concern constitutes or was likely to constitute a 
breach of the Act 
 a positive commitment to cease the conduct and 
not recommence it 
 specific details of the corrective action that will 
be taken by the company or business to remedy 
the harm caused by the conduct 
 details of redress (such as payment of 
compensation or reimbursement to consumers) 
where appropriate—including a mechanism to 
determine and audit the outcome 
 positive reporting requirements from the 
company or business to the ACCC that may 
include: 
a) a report as to when the company has 
satisfied its undertaking obligations 
b) the provision of supporting information 
and documentation by the company to the 
c) ACCC to verify that it has in fact 
satisfied its undertaking obligations 
An EU may contain commitments aimed at improving 
future compliance including: 
 participation in an FWO education program 
 training for managers and staff 
 completion of audits and compliance plans, 
adaptation of work systems and 
communication with FWO on steps taken to 
ensure ongoing compliance 
firm future actions aimed at preventing a recurrence or any 
other breach of the Act (such as an internal compliance 
and/or training program), including timeframes and other 
details 
the wrongdoer to publish a public notice about the 
contraventions and the agreed remedial actions 
an acknowledgment that the ACCC will: 
 make the undertaking publicly available including 
by placing it on the ACCC’s public register of s. 
87B undertakings on its website 
 make public reference to the undertaking, from 
time to time, including in news media statements 
and in ACCC publications 
Source: FWO (2009:5-6), ACCC (2009:5-6) 
The ACCC guidelines (2009:4) outline influential factors considered in decisions over accepting an 
EU or litigating. These include: the nature of the alleged breach in terms of seriousness of the 
conduct and its broad impact on others; the compliance history of the company, business or 
individuals involved; the compliance history of the practice, product or industry generally; and the 
apparent good faith of the alleged wrongdoer. Decision-making processes are less explicit in the 
FWO (2009:4) guidelines with references to ‘public interest’. However, given the nature of 
regulatory enforcement, it is likely that in the process of considering whether to accept an EU as an 
alternative to litigation the FWO would take into account the compliance history of the alleged 
wrongdoer and the relevant industry as these directly influence both the specific and general 
deterrence value of the EU as a regulatory tool. 
Whilst acknowledging that an EU can be a viable alternative to the expense and delay associated 
with litigation, the public interest aspects require the regulators to reflect on the general and specific 
deterrence implications of the situation and to produce a more effective regulatory outcome through 
the EU than that available through litigation. This is outlined in the FWO policy (2009:4) as 
producing 'an efficient result that compensated those persons who have suffered loss or damage as a 
result of the contravention or where it offers opportunities to ensure continuing compliance that 
may not be available via an order from a court'.  
EUs and additional obligations 
One aspect of EUs that differentiate them from other enforcement mechanisms is their ability to 
impose provisions on offenders that go beyond a court-ordered sanction.  Examination of ACCC 
s87B EUs for 2010 and 2011 identifies a range of conditions imposed on offending organisations. 
These include: ceasing questionable conduct; directly communicating with customers about EU 
requirements; publishing corrective notices (on websites or in newspapers); and a variety of 
measures for creating a compliance culture. Two companies had monetary penalties applied arising 
from infringement notices ($19,800 each), and one company was required to pay $200,000 to fund a 
research project and also to make a $200,000 charitable donation (ACCC EU Register). 
For the FWO, EUs have been used to address sham contracting, pregnancy discrimination, time and 
wage record breaches, agreement making process breaches, and industrial action (strike pay). This 
suggests that the FWO has decided that EUs are appropriate across the broad range of activities it 
regulates. The majority of FWO EUs relate to non-compliance with wages and conditions, 
reflecting the main traditional area of employer non-compliance (Maconachie & Goodwin 2010).  
Of particular interest are the additional obligations voluntarily accepted by employers to create an 
EU. Under the traditional approach to MLS enforcement the regulator primarily relied on voluntary 
rectification of the breach (particularly with regard to underpayments). Where this occurred there 
were no additional penalties or obligations placed on the employer (Maconachie & Goodwin 2010), 
and this approach remains the mainstay of FWO enforcement. However as shown in Table 2, in 
addition to rectification of underpayments, employers entering into an EU also agree to a range of 
obligations including: apology letters to employees; apologies in newspapers; audits of past 
practices; donations to third parties involved in aspects of MLS; and commitments to future 
compliance based on range of company activities that promote a compliance culture, overseen by 
the FWO for a specified period.  
Table 2: FWO enforceable undertakings' additional obligations 
Company Breach Under-
payments $ 
Additional Obligations 
CMA 
Corporation 
Limited, CMA 
Recycling Pty 
Limited, CMA 
Assets Pty Ltd 
Wages & 
conditions 
138,019  a commitment to future compliance;  
 apology letter;  
 memo to employees;  
 public notice on website for 30 days;  
 preparation of workplace compliance manual;  
 workplace relations compliance training; 
 reporting to FWO for two years. 
Fueltown 
Motors Pty Ltd 
Wages & 
conditions 
175,266  newspaper advertisement apologising to the underpaid workers;  
 report to the FWO on systems development to ensure businesses 
compliance in future;  
 participation in workplace relations compliance training;  
 provide FWO with independent audit report each year for three 
years confirming compliance with workplace laws; 
  report to the FWO on  attempts to locate underpaid workers  not 
yet located. 
Hibberd and 
Prescott 
Wages & 
conditions 
 
 
87, 997  commitment by Respondents to ensure future compliance;  
 public notice placed in Saturday edition of Mercury newspaper 
regarding the underpayments; 
  participation in workplace relations compliance training;  
 respondents to fund production of 250 information packs about 
employee rights under the FW Act to be distributed to TAFE 
hospitality students (cost capped at $500); 
  future auditing and reporting to FWO regarding the other 
businesses operated by the Employer;  
 future reporting to FWO regarding attempts to locate previous 
employees. 
Signature 
Portrait Studios 
Pty Ltd 
 
 
Sham 
contracting, 
non payment 
of wages 
4,200   $200 donation to Kingsford Community Legal Centre;  
 apology. 
CFC Retail Pty 
Ltd 
 
 
Wages & 
conditions 
464,289   future compliance; 
  letter of apology to affected employees;  
 paid meeting of affected employees;  
 public notice in newspaper; workplace notice;  
 future reporting to the FWO. 
Coles 
Supermarkets 
Australia Pty 
Ltd  
pregnancy 
discrimination 
30,401   apologies to affected employees;  
 workplace notice;  
 training;  
 amendment to policies;  
 audit of past practices;  
 $20,000 donation to Job Watch 
Ascot Haulage 
(NT) Pty Ltd 
and Northern 
Territory Freight 
Services Pty Ltd 
 
 
Wages & 
conditions, 
time & wage 
records, 
agreement-
making 
processes 
19,227  future compliance;  
 paid meeting with explanations to affected employees;  
 letter of apology to affected employees explaining the corrected 
annual leave arrangements;  
 reporting to FWO providing documentary proof;  
 human resources training. 
 
eJack Pty Ltd 
 
Wages & 
conditions 
137,983   letter of apology to affected employees;  
 paid meeting of affected employees;  
 compliance training;  
 future reporting to FWO.  
Toys R Us Pty 
Ltd 
Wages & 
conditions 
998,000  future compliance;  
 letter of apology to affected employees;  
 self-funded training of key personnel;  
 self-funded audit by relevant industry association for ongoing 
compliance. 
Kingrise 
Corporation Pty 
Ltd 
Wages & 
conditions 
41,689  future compliance;  
 letter of apology to affected employees;  
 self-funded training of key personnel;  
 self-funded audit by relevant industry association for ongoing 
compliance. 
Irvine's 
Transport (Pt. 
Pirie) Pty Ltd 
 
 
Wages & 
conditions 
 
144,464  future compliance;  
 letter of apology to employees;  
 verbal explanation to affected employees;  
 public notice;  
 self-funded training of key personnel;  
 future reporting to FWO. 
Cotton On 
Services Pty Ltd 
 
 
Wages & 
Conditions, 
Time & 
Wages 
Records 
278,126  
 future compliance;  
 written apology to employees;  
 public notices;  
 future reporting to the FWO; 
 human resources training. 
 
P&O 
Automotive and 
General 
Stevedoring Pty 
Ltd 
Industrial 
Action (strike 
payments) 
N/A  future compliance;  
 self-funded staff and management training;  
 written explanations to affected employees 
Mission 
Australia 
 
 
 
Agreement-
making (non-
lodgement of 
AWAs & 
ITEAs) 
N/A 
 
 future compliance;  
 self-funded management training;  
  written and verbal explanations to affected employees (including 
contact details of FWO officer to discuss issues if required). 
Ajlan Pty Ltd 
 
Wages & 
conditions 
 
52,574  future compliance;  
  written and verbal explanations to affected employees; 
  public notices;  
 future reporting to the FWO; 
  human resources training. 
Source: FWO EU register, http://www.fairwork.gov.au/about-us/legal/Pages/enforceable-undertakings.aspx  
Effectiveness of EUs as a minimum labour standards' enforcement mechanism 
The effectiveness of EUs as an enforcement mechanism relies on two outcomes: restorative justice; 
and deterrence (specific and/or general).  
Restorative justice 
Parker (2004:26-28) suggests four procedural elements are required for an EU to provide restorative 
justice outcomes. First, EUs should be negotiated face-to-face to ensure businesses fully 
understanding the commitments they are undertaking. Second, the meeting should be voluntary, the 
offender admitting to the conduct, and the outcomes including cooperative rectification and future 
compliance with the problems identified by the regulator. Third, where possible, 'the victims of the 
alleged misconduct and other stakeholders implicated in or affected by the conduct…should be 
present or represented in the face-to-face negotiations' (Parker 2004:27). Finally, the meeting 
should be chaired by a staff member of the regulator who is not directly involved in the 
investigation.  
At this early stage of research into the FWO’s approach to EUs the authors remain unclear on the 
actual negotiation processes adopted. Parker’s concerns relating to the importance of negotiating 
meetings (her first and fourth elements) may reflect the fact that the ACCC’s enforcement of the 
Trades Practices Act can involve highly complex issues not normally associated with MLS 
enforcement. However, companies entering into an EU with the FWO acknowledge that they have 
been given the opportunity to seek independent legal advice and that they fully understand the 
effect of the EU, so it could be assumed they have a reasonable understanding of their 
commitments. FWO EUs fully address the four aspects contained in Parker’s second procedural 
element. The third element discussed by Parker is somewhat more problematic as the FWO material 
implies that parties to negotiations are limited to FWO staff and the employer. No mention is made 
of consultations with victims. Whilst this is consistent with the traditional approach to rectification 
of underpayments where employees are ‘represented’ by the regulator, it could be viewed as a 
potential flaw when dealing with issues such as pregnancy discrimination where the EU may 
directly impact on the victim's ongoing employment prospects with the company. However, it must 
be stressed that in these cases the FWO may liaise with the victim and the oversight is in the 
available public information. Overall, it appears that FWO's use of EUs does provide victims with 
restorative justice. 
Deterrence 
The ultimate aim of all penalty regimes is the deterrence of wrongdoing, either in general or by 
specific offenders (ALRC 2002:78). Specific deterrence refers to the deterrence of the non-
complying entity from repeating the contravention whilst general deterrence refers to the deterrence 
of others from engaging in the prohibited behaviour (ALRC 2002:79). Elsewhere (Maconachie & 
Goodwin 2010) we have argued that voluntary rectification offers little in terms of either specific or 
general deterrence as the company simply pays back the wages they were legally required to pay. 
Hence no penalty is associated with the non-compliance.  
However, as shown in Table 2, in addition to the rectification of underpayments the obligations 
contained in FWO EUs require the company to address issues that led to the non-compliance, and to 
undertake a range of activities to promote a compliance culture. These activities are often overseen 
by the FWO for an agreed period. As a result, specific deterrence is assumed to be well catered for, 
however, this is dependent on FWO resources to continually monitor progress, and is of course 
subject to policy amendment.  
The general deterrence value of EUs is more difficult to evaluate. Obligations contained in FWO 
EUs relating to general deterrence are based primarily around publicity of the EU. Publicity is 
recognised as a general deterrent (ALRC 2002:83) albeit some consider publicity without penalties 
as a ‘soft sanction’ (ALRC 2002:95). Only six of the 15 FWO EUs require public notices to be 
placed in newspapers, limiting the general deterrence impact of EUs as an enforcement mechanism. 
The alternative, litigation, can impose penalties over and above restitution of unpaid wages, and 
acts as a general deterrent. In 2009-10 the FWO obtained over two million dollars in court-ordered 
penalties through 53 civil penalty litigations (FWO 2010:34). These cases were well publicised in 
media reports and by the FWO, demonstrating that non-compliance can lead to serious monetary 
penalties. Whilst EUs do not provide as strong a general deterrent as civil penalty litigations, they 
are an improvement on voluntary rectification.   
Conclusion 
EUs are a new tool in the MLS enforcement environment. Used in other regulatory environments 
with beneficial outcomes, this initial consideration of their operation in MLS enforcement throws 
up a range of issues requiring further research before their effectiveness in this arena can be 
comprehensively evaluated. These include: the negotiation process involved in offering/accepting 
an EU; determining why employers decide to accept the additional obligations imposed by an EU 
when voluntary rectification may have been a viable option; continuing evaluation of the deterrence 
value of EUs; and the role of 'victims' in the process.  
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1 Includes EUs under s.87B (1146), s.93AA (4), s.163 of Water Act (2) and general undertakings (4) and also includes 
variations of pre-existing EUs. 
2 The ACCC guidelines note that in exceptional circumstances the regulator may continue to investigate and future legal 
proceedings may be taken in relation to the same or a related matter (ACCC 2009:6). 
3 For the FWO (2009:5) this is the Fair Work Ombudsman or approved delegate and for the ACCC (2009:5) it is ‘the 
Commission itself’. 
